Stock option grants to top managers have largely contributed to the dramatic increase in US executive pay in recent years. In this paper it is argued that stock options, compared to other forms of compensation, have created strong incentives for managers to engage in lobbying activities for higher compensation. The empirical results presented for the S&P 500 firms and the years from 1992 to 1997 show that the relative success of such skimming activities is shaped by institutional controls. Stock option grants are substantially lower when control by the board of directors and the shareholders is higher, and competition on the product market of a firm is stronger. (108 words) JEL classification: G3, J3, L2, M1
Introduction
Are today's top managers worth the money they earn? This question is of much public and academic concern in view of the highly increasing compensations granted to managers in the United States, but also in Europe. In 1998, the CEOs of the S&P 500 firms earned on average 7.9 million US $, compared to 2.5 million US $ in 1992. 1 And there seems to be no upper limit to the salaries received by top executives. In 1997, Henry R. Silverman of Cendant Corporation received approximately 257 million US $ in stock options alone. This is an extreme example of a general development that saw median salaries for the CEOs of the S&P 500 firms double between 1970 and 1996, and the total income (i.e. including earnings from stock options) being quadrupled in real terms (Murphy 1999 (Murphy , p. 2486 . At the same time, the gap between top managers and other employee groups has been widening. In 1998, an average CEO earned a total compensation (including stock options) that was 270 times higher than the average compensation of a production worker, a ratio that has risen from 26:1 in 1970. All these developments can largely be attributed to the increasing use of stock options in executive compensation (Perry and Zenner 2000). 2 The issue of whether managers are worth these compensations has received differing interpretations. Proponents of principal-agent-theory stress the optimality of prevalent compensation contracts. In their view, contracts are efficiently designed by a rational principal intending to maximize firm-value. Thus, observed stock option compensations reflect an efficient provision of incentives to managers. Stock options serve as an incentive mechanism to direct the managers' efforts away from pursuing their self-interests, and towards increasing firm value. On the other hand, practitioners such as Graef Crystal (1991) doubt the optimality of managers' compensation contracts. According to this view, managers have some discretionary leeway to set their own pay, i.e. they can manipulate the pay process, or their contract-setting principal more generally, to their advantage. Then, current compensation levels may at least partly reflect rents 1 The data on manager compensation for the Standard and Poor's 500 firms used in this paper is provided by 3 that the managers have been able to skim, e.g. in the form of stock option payments in a bullish stock market environment.
In this paper we provide arguments as well as empirical evidence for the second view. First, it is argued that stock options, compared to other forms of compensation, create strong incentives for managers to engage in lobbying activities for higher compensation. Stock options allow managers to raise their total income with a relatively low risk of losses, and with a relatively low risk of attracting the attention of the shareholders. We discuss these two points in turn and emphasize that managers hardly ever have to bear the downside risk potentially associated with stock options, and that stock option compensation is of low transparency to shareholders. An examination of stock option compensation of the S&P 500 firms and the years from 1992 to 1997 shows, however, that not all managers have succeeded in getting high stock option grants in the bullish stock market environment of the 90's. In the empirical analysis, it is tested whether differences in institutional controls can explain this variation. We find evidence that weakened checks and balances between the board of directors and top executives raise managers' pay in the form of stock options. Compensation through stock options is also higher in companies with a broad distribution of shares among shareholders. Finally, in sectors of the economy where product market competition is weak, higher amounts of stock options are granted to managers.
These results hold even when a wide range of other potential influences, like individual and firm characteristics or firm profitability, is controlled for. Thus, managers facing weak institutional restrictions have been able to raise their total compensation via stock options more than theirequally successful -counterparts working in otherwise similar firms. (2000), for example, offer evidence that CEOs in firms with weaker governance structures are relatively more rewarded for luck, i.e. observable shocks to performance beyond the manager's control, and are charged less for options they are granted. Our paper is in the same spirit by supporting the view that it matters whether managers are 'agents with or without principals'. To our knowledge, however, this is the first paper to analyze the issue with respect to stock option grants, which are arguably the most important component in executive compensation today and largely account for the developments mentioned at the outset. Moreover, we try to extend the analysis in various respects. First, a broader view is taken with regard to institutional restrictions. We simultaneously include three important mechansims of management control: the structure of shareholders, of the board of directors and of the product market of a firm. Second, the empirical analysis includes top managers in general and is not restricted to CEOs. And third, data for the years from 1992 to 1997 are studied, i.e. the period when the use of stock options has become the most prevalent.
In a broader view, the paper can be seen as a contribution to a growing literature on determinants of executive compensation not grounded in agency theory (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998). As a special issue of the Academy of Management Journal on "Managerial Compensation and Firm Performance" concluded: "In short, after at least six decades of research, the failure to identify a robust relationship between top management compensation and firm performance has led scholars into a blind alley. To move this stream of research forward requires that greater efforts be devoted to examining alternative mechanisms and criteria for how top management compensation is set." (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998: 135). This finding is also increasingly accepted by proponents of principal-agent-theory. Kevin J. Murphy (1999) surveys a large number of studies based on agency theory that have investigated the mode of action of stock and stock-option plans for top executives. It becomes evident that the empirical basis for the justification of stock options as a pure incentive mechanism is indeed weak: "Although there is ample evidence that CEOs (and other employees) respond predictably to dysfunctional compensation arrangements, it is more difficult to document that the increase in stock-based incentives has led CEOs to work harder, smarter, and more in the interest of shareholders" (p. 2555-6). Thus, there seems to be room for alternative explanations. In this paper, an institutional approach is applied by ascribing the increase in stock option grants to weak institutional restrictions, allowing top executives to follow their own interests.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the managers' interest in stock options as a possible explanation for the prevalent compensation levels and compares this view to other approaches. In Section 3, three institutional factors that restrict the managers' self-interested behavior are presented. We then test our hypotheses empirically for panel data including the top managers of the S&P 500 firms and the years from 1992 to 1997. Section 4 draws conclusions. 5 
The Managers' Interest in Stock Options
Why should a top manager specifically strive for stock option compensation that an optimally controlling principal would not grant him? In this section, we argue that stock options, compared to other forms of compensation, allow managers to raise their total income with a relatively low risk of losses, and with a relatively low risk of attracting the attention of the shareholders. Stock options thus constitute a relatively attractive tool to raise income, and especially did so in the bullish stock market environment of the 90ies. The growing use of stock option compensation in this period can partly be considered a consequence of the managers' self-interest.
The first point of this view -that stock options generate a low risk of losses -contrasts with an optimal contracting view as provided by agency theory. According to this approach, stock options are a means of disciplining the management. They impose more risk on the managers because they make compensation dependent on the volatility of the firm's success and other factors.
Managers might agree with such an incentive contract, but only if they are compensated for the greater risks taken. As managers are assumed to be risk averse, their expected total compensation including stock options should then in fact be higher than with a fixed income.
We do not take issue with this idea as such, but argue that in the very reality of management compensation, the additional risk managers have to bear is of little relevance. Managers hardly ever face downside risks; thus stock options are a relatively riskless way of increasing total compensation. Three observations support this view. First, stock options virtually never replace the basic salaries of managers, but are most commonly granted over and above the basic salary.
Whenever this is the case, the management can only win when option plans are introduced or extended. In financial reports, no direct measures exist on how much managers are charged (if at all) for the stock options they are granted. However, one way of charging would be to adjust the managers' basic salaries downwards when options are given to them. Following the empirical approach of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000), we tested whether this holds for the managers in our dataset (see Table A in the Appendix). Controlling for various measures of firm success and including firm and year fixed effects, we find the opposite relationship. The managers' basic salaries go up in proportion to the stock options they are granted (in Black-Scholes values). The effect is small (an increase of 9'500 US $ in basic salary for one million in stock options), but nevertheless statistically highly significant (t=20.0). Second, even if other components of pay 6 would be adjusted downwards, managers could apply hedging strategies against a possible drop in share prices or other forms of risk (Bettis et al. 1999 , Osterloh 1999 , p. 190, Perry and Zenner 2000 . Third, hedging is often not even necessary. If share prices remain below the exercise price of the issued options, many firms undertake a repricing of their stock options or issue additional options with a lower exercise price, a practice used e.g. by Microsoft after a sharp drop in its share prices in April 2000. Of course, this eliminates most of the remaining downside risk that managers might face (and it tends to be against the interest of shareholders, see e.g. Brenner et al.
2000, Chance et al. 2000).
Stock options offer a number of advantages that can explain the managers' interest in this kind of compensation. The first and foremost advantage lies in the lack of transparency. Although footnote disclosure is required, stock options are not listed in a firm's balance sheet and therefore give the managers an opportunity to acquire additional income in a relatively concealed way.
Murphy (1999, p. 2514) puts forward a similar argument when stating that "[...] stock option compensation is essentially "free" from an accounting perspective, explaining (I believe) the popularity of "broad-base" company-wide option programs that are difficult to rationalize from an incentive standpoint." A strong indication of such usage is the extensive lobbying activities of US firms against a new regulation by the Financial Accounting Standard Board, which would have prescribed listing the cost of option plans along with earnings. In 1995, the lobbyists successfully prevented the new standard from being implemented. Their political struggle was justified by the argument that "[...] if the cost of option schemes were treated in that way, fewer of them would be awarded, fewer people would have reason to maximize shareholder value and the economy would suffer" (Economist 7.8.1999, p. 19) . In fact, according to the consulting firm Smithers & Co., if all the liabilities engaged in via option plans in 1998 were deducted from the profits made in the same year, this would have resulted in 50% lower profits (Murray 1999 ).
Finally, stock options also offer advantages in terms of taxation practices. Murphy (1999, p. 2514) argues that "[...] in spite of the obvious incentive implications, the popularity of stock options reflects in large part their favorable tax and accounting treatment. In particular, stock options offer an attractive way to defer taxable income, and are largely invisible from corporate accounting statements."
The reasons outlined support the idea that stock options generate strong incentives for managers to engage in activities which lead to higher stock option grants. The corresponding efforts in the compensation process can be considered a form of rent-seeking (for the political realm, see Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock 1980), which is not in line with shareholders' interests, and which possibly decreases a corporation's value. Indeed, a large number of studies based on agency theory has only found weak empirical evidence that stock options as an incentive mechanism really raise firms' performance.
The reference studies in this respect contributed by Jensen and Murphy (1990) Stock prices can also rise when dividends are cut. Lambert, Lanen and Larcker (1989) and more recently Fenn and Liang (1999) show that the higher the quota of stock options in the management's total compensation, the lower a firm's distribution of dividends. For these reasons, it is difficult to show by means of capital market data whether or not stock options work as incentives that make managers care more for their company's success. There are, however, important theoretical arguments that speak against strong incentive mechanisms. Most obvious is the public good dilemma. Each manager benefiting from company success via stock option plans faces incentives to free-ride. 3 Thus, even if a small positive relationship between stock option grants and firm value should exist, it seems difficult to justify the current levels of stock option compensation on pay-forperformance grounds alone. There seems to be room for alternative explanations that depart from an optimal contracting view. If stock option grants reflect, at least partly, rent-seeking activities by top managers, it can be expected that institutional restrictions systematically influence the relative success of these activities. In the following, three restrictions on the managers' behavior are investigated: the influence of the board of directors, the ownership structure and the extent of competition on the respective product market. We empirically estimate the effects of these institutional controls on stock option compensation, and put the results in the context of other studies that employ different measures or approaches.
Institutional Determinants of Stock Option Plans
Before developing and discussing the hypotheses, we present the data on executive compensation used for the empirical analysis, and give some descriptive statistics on the trends in absolute terms as well as in the variation of stock option grants for the period 1992-1997.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our sample is based on Standard & Poor's "Executive Compensation" data set. ExecuComp contains detailed information on the amount and composition of top executive compensation for up to five top executives from a large number of firms traded on US stock exchanges. We restrict our analysis to the 500 US Blue Chips combined in the S&P 500 index. 4 Data is available since the SEC changed proxy disclosure rules; i.e. we use data for the period from 1992 to 1997. In addition to compensation data, ExecuComp provides information about the executives' function and some extra information about the firms they work for. As the institutional setting, as well as the performance of the firms, is of crucial importance for our study, we have added selected data on the firms from Standard and Poor's "Compustat" 5 , and data on market concentration from the US-Bureau of Census. The resulting data set contains a theoretical number of roughly 15'000 observations for the six years being analyzed. However, important information is missing for a substantial number of managers, and with respect to the institutional variables employed also for some of the firms. This lowers the number of observations fit for evaluation to roughly 12'250 manager years and 422 firms.
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A first inspection of the data reveals the well known trends in executive compensation in the 90's. Table 1 gives descriptive statistics on average total compensation and average stock option compensation for the years from 1992 to 1997. Average total compensation for S&P500 top managers rose from 1.4 million US $ in 1992 to 3.3 million US $ in 1997. The absolute amount of stock options the managers received grew from roughly an average of 720'000 US $ in the year 1992 to over 2.2 million US $ in 1997. It is remarkable that the proportion of stock option compensation has risen from about 36 percent of total compensation in 1992 to over 49 percent in 1997. However, a look at the standard deviations indicates that there is also growing variation in stock option grants over the period considered. Thus, managers have benefitted to quite different extents from the general increasing trend in stock option compensation. In the cross section time series analysis, we will try to link these differences to varying intensities of institutional controls. Table 2 lists summary statistics for these variables. Individual characteristics of the managers: "Executive Compensation" offers little information on the managers themselves. Only two factors potentially influencing the amount of option-based pay are provided: whether the respective manager is CEO of the firm, and the manager's gender.
Approximately 15 percent of the managers in the data are CEOs and only slightly more than two percent are women.
Size and growth rate of the company: An array of studies demonstrates that the size of a company is a relevant factor in determining the level of salaries and compensation (see e. g. Tosi et al.
2000, Medoff 1989, Rosen 1982 ). On average, large firms pay higher wages.
Company size is portrayed by three factors: sales, number of employees and total assets.
Financial success of the company: A company's success should constitute a major factor in the level of compensation granted to managers. We attempt to capture it by using four types of measures: return on assets, profits per share, dividends per share and the P/E-ratio as an indicator of the respective firm's evaluation by the financial market.
Hypotheses and operationalization
The relevance of three institutional control mechansims for stock option compensation and their operationalization for the empirical analysis are discussed in turn: the structure of the board of directors, the ownership structure of a firm, and product market competition.
Board structure
The board of directors represents the shareholders as the authority in charge of controlling management and is usually responsible for deciding on management compensation schemes. In the USA, this function is performed by compensation committees. Those commissions are constituted by the board of directors and may only consist of external members. It is their task to prepare a proposal for compensation schemes, which has to be ratified by the board in corpore. In many cases, however, the decision process on the specific question of management compensation is much more informal. Usually, the compensation committee receives for revision and/or ratification the suggestions for compensation plans worked out by the management of the human resources department. That is followed by an extensive process involving compromises and to be the highest, most responsible in the firm, and are therefore paid more than junior executives who don't sit on the board. Certainly, the variable member of the board partly reflects such differences in individual productivity of the managers. We therefore include a second variable on board composition in the analysis that estimates entanglement effects irrespective of individual productivity.
The variable number of managers on the firms' board indicates the absolute number of executive directors for each firm and each year, i.e. the number of a firms' top managers who are sitting on their own companies' board. If the management of a firm is strongly represented on the board of directors, the controlling function of the board is undermined, and rent seeking activities can be expected to be more successful. We thus hypothesize that the larger the absolute number of executive directors is, the larger are stock option grants for the managers in a firm. In the data set used, there are on average 2.31 managers sitting on their companies' board.
Ownership structure
What structure in the group of shareholders leads to optimal control in a firm? Is a wide distribution of the shares preferable to a single major shareholder? In the more recent literature on corporate governance, the rather differentiated answer is given that neither of the two polar cases Such measures serve the self-interest of the major shareholder (and the managers) rather than focussing on increasing the total value of the company.
The higher the concentration of shares is, the higher are thus in general the incentives for the shareholders to engage in an effective supervision of the management. We hence expect that the higher the concentration of shares among the shareholders is, the lower is the amount of stock options granted to managers. At high levels of concentration, the relationship may be weakened and eventually even be reversed because of the countervailing entrenchment-effect.
In the empirical analysis, we operationalize concentration of ownership by the proportion of outstanding stock an average shareholder owns. In the firms composing the data set, the average shareholder holds 0.014 percent of the total capital stock. From 1992 to 1997, the average share of a stockholder decreased from 0.04 to 0.001 percent. We are aware that the average proportion of the stock capital owned by one shareholder might only insufficiently reflect the restrictions emerging from differing ownership structures. The leeway of the board of directors and the managers is of course also determined by whom the shares are owned (institutional investors, banks, ...) and by how exactly those shares are dispersed. However, changes in the share of the total capital stock an average shareholder holds can still indicate variation in the strength of block holders. Thus, the average share gives a rough measure on how pronounced the free-rider problem is among firm owners.
Extent of competition in the firm's product market
The market concentration on the target market of a firm constitutes one of the major restrictions on management. Competitive pressure forces the companies not only to take the preferences of the customers more into account, but also induces them to produce in a more cost efficient way.
Managers subjected to fierce competition find it more difficult to pursue matters of self-interest than a management in a monopoly situation. We thus expect firms that are operating in contested markets to award their managers with ceteris paribus less option-based compensation in order to remain competitive in such an environment. However, a countervailing effect can also be expected mitigating such a relationship. Firms in contested markets have an increased demand for talented managers, as only those can guarantee success in complex and demanding environments (see Finkelstein and Boyd 1998, p. 183 ). Those managerial talents will earn more than their peers of lesser talent. It is difficult to theoretically predict which of the two effects will prevail. We assume, however, that up to a certain degree of competition the restrictive force of competition dominates. Thus, we expect that the higher the stress of competition (or the smaller the market concentration) on the target market of a firm is, the smaller is the amount of stock options granted to managers. This relationship weakens and may eventually even be reversed with increasing competition.
Although it is well understood that market competition plays an important role in shaping management behavior, its effects on the level of stock option grants have not yet been studied. Moreover, less competition also means that higher returns can be obtained in general, which can then be appropriated (at least in part) by the managers.
Empirical Results
We assess the relationship between varying intensities of institutional controls and stock option grants in a cross section time series analysis. Table 3 presents the results of an OLS panel regression for the sample of top managers of the S&P 500 firms and the years from 1992 to 1997.
The estimation includes fixed effects for each firm as well as dummy variables for every year (except the base year 1992). This procedure allows to capture any firm specific or industry specific determinants of stock option compensation by the firm fixed effects, and time trends or
year effects by the year dummies. Thus, these influences do not bias the coefficients we estimate for the institutional determinants.
As the index for market concentration applied in this paper exhibits no variance over time, and as the firms considered do not switch market sectors, this measure cannot be included in an estimate 16 with firm specific fixed effects. Therefore, in a first step a firm fixed-effects regression excluding market concentration data is run (table 3) . In a second step, the firm specific fixed effects are regressed on market concentration and its square (table 4) .
The following regression equations are estimated: 
Based on the hypotheses advanced, we expect the following (algebraic) signs: β 1 >0, β 2 >0, β 3 <0, β 4 >0, β 17 >0 and β 18 <0. We discuss regression results given in tables 3 and 4 for each of these variables in turn. 
Board structure
Entanglement between the management and the board of directors leads to higher stock option grants, ceteris paribus. We find a positive and statistically significant relationship for both variables on board structure. On an individual level, membership on the board of directors raises the amount of income paid in stock options by approximately 735'000 US $. Over and above that, every additional manager sitting on the company's board results in an increase in stock option compensation of roughly 200'000 US $. Whereas for the first variable considered, the individual membership on the board of directors, it can be argued that the estimate partly reflects differences in the managers productivity, this is not likely to matter for the second variable, the number of managers on the companies' board. The estimate for the latter variable indicates rent seeking activities of significant size. The more managers are appointed members of the board, and thus are essentially responsible for controlling themselves, the higher the amounts of option-based pay. We replicate the well established finding that the structure of the board affects executive compensation, here with respect to stock option grants.
The absolute numbers given, however, should be considered with care. Standard and Poors uses non-standard modifications to the classical Black-Scholes defintion of option value calculation for its ExecuComp data set. Moreover, it has been convincingly argued that stock option grants have less than Black-Scholes value for the managers who get them, because they are undiversified (Hall and Murphy 2000) . Interesting is therefore not the absolute value as such, but the result that variation in the entanglement between the board of directors and the management causes significant differences in stock option compensation.
Concentration of shareholders
A higher concentration of shareholders significantly lowers the amount of money paid in stock options. Since the estimate for the squared term is positive, the relationship becomes weaker as the concentration of shareholders increases and eventually the slope becomes even negative. The shape of the curve thus exactly matches the theoretical expectations. However, the squared term only becomes predominant if an average single shareholder owns more than 0.17 per cent of the total stocks, which is the case for less than one percent of the firms included in the data set. The concentration of shareholders has a considerable impact: in absolute terms, an increase in the proportion held by the average shareholder by half a standard deviation lowers the managers' income in stock options by approximately 420'000 US $.
Although the accuracy of the measure employed is to some extent questionable, we derive results fully consistent with those found in related studies. In a recent study, Hartzell and Starks (2000) analyze the impact of institutional investors on executive compensation. They find a significant negative relationship between the concentration of institutional ownership and the level of stock option compensation in a firm, suggesting that a stronger presence of institutional investors results in a more effective control of the managers' rent seeking activities.
Market concentration
The more a market is dominated by a few large firms, the less competition exists in this sector and the less the consequences are felt when (excessively) high salaries are paid. Following this hypothesis, market concentration exerts a positive influence on compensation in the form of stock options. The results in table 2 show that the higher the product market concentration, i. e. the less competition there is, the higher the amount of stock options granted to managers. According to the theoretical prediction, the effect weakens with increasing market concentration, as is evident in the negative squared term. The theoretical predictions are exactly matched by the empirical results. However, the squared term dominates only with a market concentration of more than 100 percent, and is hence of no relevance for the sectors analyzed here. The size of the effect is again significant: an increase in the market concentration by half a standard deviation increases the average income in stock options by roughly 135'000 US $.
Control variables
For the control variables, we find results consistent with previous research. CEOs receive more stock options, women receive less stock options and large companies pay more in stock options, as do successful companies. The positive relationship between profitability and stock option compensation we find well supports the agency-theory view on executive compensation.
However, causality again remains unclear. For successful companies, for example, reversed causality may be assumed as their stock prices usually show stronger growth, thereby generating 20 a disproportionate increase in the value of stock options granted. Nevertheless, it is important to control for measures of profitability in the regression. This assures the result that ceteris paribus equally successful managers are granted more stock options when there is less control in a firm's institutional environment.
Sensitivity tests
The robustness of the results is tested using two alternative procedures. Firstly, the proportion of income paid in stock options is considered as a dependent variable instead of the absolute value of stock options. This accounts for the influence of the institutional environment on the composition of total compensation, rather than the absolute amount. Secondly, we use the natural logarithm of the absolute value of option grants as a dependent variable. Results are reported in tables 5 and 6. 
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The sensitivity tests reported in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that the results remain basically unchanged when estimating alternative specifications. The sizes of the coefficients change to some extent, but the variables of interest in general show the same signs and remain statistically significant at the 99 percent level. This result holds independently of whether one examines the proportion of total compensation paid in stock options or the natural logarithm of the absolute amount of stock options granted as the dependent variable. Only the estimates for the variable number of managers on the board seem to be quite sensitive. Whereas we find the expected positive sign with respect to the proportion paid in stock options (at the border of statistical significance), the relationship is reversed when considering the natural logarithm of option grants. One reason for this might be that the logarithmic specification gives lower weights to very high option grants than the regressions using the absolute value or the proportion of stock option compensation. It is interesting to note that such very high option grants seem to be specifically correlated with the number of managers on the board and not with other variables.
In general, the findings presented are robust. Institutional restrictions for top executives indeed are likely to matter for the amount of pay the managers receive in stock options, as well as for the composition of their compensation.
Conclusions
Stock option grants to top managers have largely contributed to the dramatic increase in US executive pay in recent years. In this paper, it has been argued that stock options, compared to other forms of compensation, provide managers with strong incentives to engage in lobbying activities for higher compensation. This process is facilitated by the fact that option-based pay can be justified by its assumed property to be a positive performance incentive. However, the empirical evidence on the relationship between 'pay for performance' and share return is rather weak and the direction of causality is unclear. Thus, there is room for alternative explanations of current levels of stock option compensation. We focus on institutional determinants of stock option grants. It is argued, and empirical evidence is offered, that weak institutional restrictions have allowed top managers to skim rents in the form of stock option payments in a bullish stock market environment. Three institutional restrictions are analyzed: the composition of the board of directors, the concentration of shareholders and market competition. The empirical results
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presented for the S&P 500 firms and the years from 1992 to 1997 show that the more managers are exposed to control, the less compensation they receive in stock options in absolute value, as well as in proportion of total income.
The study has some shortcomings that further research should improve upon. First, it would be desirable to have a better and more complete set of measures on the institutional environment that controls management behavior. The measures we employ are to some extent open to criticism and do not reflect control mechanisms as precisely as one would like. However, in our view the three institutional measures as a whole offer convincing support for the hypotheses advanced.
The results correspond well with findings of other studies that study the impact of corporate governance structures on executive compensation. Second, it would be interesting to analyze stock option grants in a declining stock market environment, i.e. for more recent data from the period after 2000. One might suspect that stock options no longer seem as attractive to managers as they used to, and consequently stock option grants have decreased -although principals providing ‚optimal' pay for performance incentives would not do so. 
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